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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Markian Slobodian, in his capacity as trustee of debtor 
Net Pay Services, Inc., appeals the District Court’s summary 
judgment in favor of the Internal Revenue Service. The 
District Court denied Slobodian’s motion to avoid five 
alleged preferential transfers under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) of the 
Bankruptcy Code. The District Court held that four of the five 
payments were not avoidable because of their minimal value. 
And although the fifth payment was sufficiently large to 
constitute a preference, it was not avoidable because the 
funds were not property of Net Pay’s estate. For the reasons 
that follow, we will affirm.  
I 
 The facts of this case are straightforward. Before it 
filed for protection under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, 
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Net Pay managed its clients’ payrolls and handled their 
employment taxes pursuant to a form contract called a 
“Payroll Services Agreement,” which required clients to 
provide their employee payroll information so Net Pay could 
determine the taxes and wages they owed. The Agreement 
gave clients the option of authorizing Net Pay to transfer 
funds from their bank accounts into Net Pay’s account and to 
remit those funds to the clients’ employees, the IRS, and 
other taxing authorities. The Agreement also established an 
independent contractor relationship between Net Pay and its 
clients, disclaiming “any relationship of employment, agency, 
joint venture, partnership, or any other fiduciary relationship 
of any kind.” App. 189. 
 At issue in this appeal are five transfers Net Pay made 
on behalf of its clients to the Internal Revenue Service on 
May 5, 2011—almost three months before it filed its Chapter 
7 petition. These transfers included: (1) $32,297 on behalf of 
Altus Capital Partners, Inc.; (2) $5,338 on behalf of 
HealthCare Systems Connections, Inc.; (3) $1,143 on behalf 
of Project Services, LLC; (4) $352.84 for an unknown client; 
and (5) $281.13 for another unknown client. The day after 
these transfers were made, Net Pay informed its clients that it 
was “ceasing business operations including all payroll 
processing.” App. 267.  
 As trustee for Net Pay, Slobodian sought to recover the 
monies represented by these five payments, arguing that they 
were avoidable preferential transfers.1 Slobodian and the IRS 
                                              
 1 The Bankruptcy Code allows trustees to “avoid any 
transfer of an interest of the debtor in property (1) to or for 
the benefit of a creditor; (2) for or on account of an 
antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was 
made; (3) made while the debtor was insolvent; (4) made . . . 
on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the 
petition . . . (5) that enables such creditor to receive more than 
such creditor would receive” in the debtor’s bankruptcy 
proceedings. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b). 
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filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The District 
Court granted the IRS judgment as a matter of law.2  
 The District Court concluded that four of the five 
transfers were not subject to recovery as preference payments 
because they were less than the minimum amount established 
by law ($5,850). 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(9) (2013). Recognizing 
that four of the payments were beneath that threshold, the 
Trustee argued that because the payments exceeded $5,850 in 
the aggregate, the statutory threshold did not apply. The 
District Court disagreed, reasoning that distinct transfers may 
be aggregated for purposes of defeating the threshold only if 
they are “‘transactionally related’ to the same debt.” 
Slobodian v. U.S. ex rel. Comm’r, 533 B.R. 126, 132–133 
(M.D. Pa. 2015). Because the payments of $5,338, $1,143, 
$353, and $281 were “separate and unrelated transactions in 
satisfaction of independent antecedent debts” to different 
creditors, the Court held that they could not be aggregated to 
satisfy the statutory minimum. Id. at 133. 
 As for the $32,297 payment Net Pay made on behalf of 
Altus, which plainly exceeded the statutory minimum, the 
question remained whether it was a “transfer of an interest of 
the debtor in property.” 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (emphasis added). 
To evaluate that question, the District Court noted that 
section 7501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code creates a 
special statutory trust in favor of the United States for taxes 
withheld from employee paychecks (otherwise known as 
“trust fund” taxes). Informed by the Supreme Court’s opinion 
interpreting that provision in Begier v. Commissioner, 496 
U.S. 53 (1990), the District Court held that Net Pay lacked an 
interest in the transferred funds because they were held in 
trust under § 7501(a) at the moment they were withheld.  
Notwithstanding this evidence, the Trustee emphasized 
that $6,527.90 of the Altus payment was designated for 
employer, non-trust-fund tax obligations unaffected by 
§ 7501(a). The District Court saw the evidence differently, 
finding that the payroll summary offered by Net Pay in 
support of this assertion failed to “identify what portion of 
                                              
2 The District Court had withdrawn the reference from 
the bankruptcy court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(d).  
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Altus’s non-trust fund and trust fund tax obligations were 
outstanding at the time.” Id. at 137 (emphasis added). 
Because there was unrefuted evidence that the IRS applied 
the entire $32,297 toward Altus’s trust fund tax obligations, 
the Court held that the payment was not avoidable as a 
preference. 
 This timely appeal followed.3  
II 
  We begin with the Trustee’s argument that the four 
smaller value transfers may be aggregated to exceed the 
Bankruptcy Code’s minimum threshold for the avoidance of 
preferential transfers.4 We have not had occasion to examine 
this provision, which states that the “trustee may not avoid 
. . . a transfer . . . if, in a case filed by a debtor whose debts 
are not primarily consumer debts, the aggregate value of all 
                                              
3  The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 157 and 28 U.S.C. § 1334. We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s 
summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as 
the District Court. Viera v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 642 F.3d 
407, 413 (3d Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is proper “if the 
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “In conducting our 
review, we view the record in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that 
party’s favor.” Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs Grp., 765 F.3d 
350, 358 (3d Cir. 2014). 
4  Assuming the Government’s interpretation of the 
§ 7501(a) trust provision is correct, it would not affect the 
four smaller transfers, which related to non-trust-fund taxes 
not covered by § 7501(a). On the other hand, if Net Pay’s 
arrangements with its clients created a trust relationship under 
state or federal law, Net Pay would not have an interest in any 
of the property transferred to the IRS. See infra at 19–21 n.13. 
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property that constitutes or is affected by such transfer is less 
than $5,850.”5 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(9).  
A 
Although section 547(c)(9) is less than pellucid, it is 
clear that the “aggregate value” of “all property” that 
“constitutes or is affected by” a debtor’s “transfer to or for the 
benefit of a creditor” must be at least $5,850 to be avoidable 
as a preference. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(1), (c)(9). But this leaves 
unanswered the question whether small-value transfers for the 
benefit of different creditors and based on distinct debts can 
be aggregated and avoided as preferential. Citing an 
interpretive rule—“the singular includes the plural,” 11 
U.S.C. § 102(7)—the Trustee reads the Bankruptcy Code to 
allow the aggregation of transfers that individually fall below 
the threshold, as long as they were all to the same transferee. 
We reject the Trustee’s reading. As we shall explain, when 
read in context, § 547(c)(9) precludes aggregation of multiple 
preferential transfers for the benefit of different creditors on 
distinct debts.  
1 
 A “central policy” of the Bankruptcy Code is 
“[e]quality of distribution among creditors.” Begier, 496 U.S. 
at 58. “According to that policy, creditors of equal priority 
should receive pro rata shares of the debtor’s property.” Id. 
The power of bankruptcy trustees to avoid preferential 
transfers that benefit certain creditors over others is critical to 
this system. “This mechanism prevents the debtor from 
favoring one creditor over others by transferring property 
shortly before filing for bankruptcy.” Id. The fear is that “[i]f 
preference law fails to preserve absolute equality in 
                                              
5 This dollar amount has since been increased, but the 
old amount controls. See Revision of Certain Dollar Amounts 
in the Bankruptcy Code Prescribed Under Section 104(A) of 
the Code, 75 Fed. Reg. 8747, 8748 (Feb. 21, 2013); 11 U.S.C. 
§ 104(c). The IRS has the burden of proving the 
unavoidability of a transfer under § 547(c)(9). J.P. Fyfe, Inc. 
of Fla. v. Bradco Supply Corp., 891 F.2d 66, 71 (3d Cir. 
1989); 11 U.S.C. § 547(g). 
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liquidation, those creditors who are aware of this failure will 
compete for position during insolvency rather than 
cooperating fully in an attempt to maximize the value of the 
firm.” Note, Preferential Transfers and the Value of the 
Insolvent Firm, 87 Yale L.J. 1449, 1455 (1978); see also In re 
Molded Acoustical Prods., Inc., 18 F.3d 217, 219 (3d Cir. 
1994) (“[T]he preference rule aims to ensure that creditors are 
treated equitably, both by deterring the failing debtor from 
treating preferentially its most obstreperous or demanding 
creditors in an effort to stave off a hard ride into bankruptcy, 
and by discouraging the creditors from racing to dismember 
the debtor.”). 
 The Bankruptcy Code includes certain exceptions to 
the general preference rules. For example, a trustee may not 
avoid a transfer made “in the ordinary course of business,” 11 
U.S.C. § 547(c)(2), “because it does not detract from the 
general policy of the preference section to discourage unusual 
action by either the debtor or his creditors during the debtor’s 
slide into bankruptcy.” Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 
160 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, it 
furthers bankruptcy policies by “encourage[ing] creditors to 
continue dealing with distressed debtors on normal business 
terms” and “promot[ing] equality of distribution by ensuring 
that creditors are treated equitably.” In re Pillowtex Corp., 
427 B.R. 301, 306 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010) (citing In re Molded 
Acoustical Prods., Inc., 18 F.3d 217, 219 (3d Cir. 1994)).  
 The § 547(c)(9) minimum threshold is a relatively new 
addition to the Code.6 See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109–8, 119 Stat. 
23 (April 20, 2005). This provision was intended to benefit 
creditors who had to decide whether small-value preference 
actions were worth defending. See Kevin C. Driscoll Jr., 
Bankruptcy 2005: New Landscape for Preference 
Proceedings, Am. Bankr. Inst. J., June 2005, at 1, 56. Given 
                                              
 6  A longer standing, nearly identical provision set a 
lower threshold for consumer cases: “The trustee may not 
avoid . . . a transfer . . . if, in a case filed by an individual 
debtor whose debts are primarily consumer debts, the 
aggregate value of all property that constitutes or is affected 
by such transfer is less than $600.” 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(8). 
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that “spending $10,000 in legal fees to defeat a $5,000 
preference is a Pyrrhic victory,” many “defendants in these 
smaller preferences chose to settle otherwise defendable 
claims.” Id. Accordingly, as one court has observed, the 
essential function of the minimum threshold is to 
“discourage[] litigation over relatively insignificant transfer 
amounts” in order to “promote commercial and judicial 
efficiency, not only by reducing litigation over nominal 
amounts, but also by preventing creditors with smaller claims 
from waiving otherwise meritorious defenses simply because 
the costs associated with defending against trustees’ 
avoidance actions exceed any anticipated benefits.” In re Bay 
Area Glass, Inc., 454 B.R. 86, 90 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011).  
2 
 In view of this statutory scheme, the Trustee’s 
argument makes little sense. An individual creditor’s ability 
to invoke the minimum threshold as a defense would depend 
not only upon whether the transfer from which it benefitted 
was less than $5,850, but also on whether the debtor had 
made any transfers (large or small) for the benefit of other 
creditors, and whether all transfers taken together exceed the 
statutory threshold. As the following hypothetical 
demonstrates, this cannot be the law.  
 Assume a debtor has 1,000 creditors to whom it paid 
$5,000 each during the preference period. If we accepted the 
Trustee’s argument, the debtor’s estate would be able to 
recover this $5,000,000 and none of those creditors would be 
able to invoke the $5,850 minimum threshold as a defense. 
This would render § 547(c)(9) ineffective. In fact, the 
statute’s only effect would be to apply in the very few 
bankruptcies where creditors were paid, in the aggregate, less 
than $5,850 during the preference period. Because this 
construction would render the minimum threshold an “empty 
promise,”7 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2495 (2015), we 
must reject it. 
                                              
 7  The Trustee’s suggestion at oral argument that 
aggregation should be liberally permitted when a number of 
transfers for the benefit of independent creditors are made to 
a single transferee might limit these concerns to some extent, 
 9 
 The Supreme Court has recognized that “[a] provision 
that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the 
remainder of the statutory scheme . . . because only one of the 
permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is 
compatible with the rest of the law.” United Sav. Ass’n of 
Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 
371 (1988) (internal citation omitted). Section 547(c)(9) is 
such a provision. And close inspection of the statutory 
scheme reveals that an interpretation of the minimum 
threshold that fails to distinguish between creditors is 
incompatible with the preference regime.   
B 
 Unlike the Trustee’s argument, the District Court’s 
reading of § 547(c)(9) is faithful both to the text of the statute 
and the law as a whole. To reiterate, the defense provides that 
a debtor’s “transfer to or for the benefit of a creditor” may not 
be avoided if the “aggregate value” of “all property” that 
“constitutes or is affected by such transfer” is “less than 
$5,850.” 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(1), (c)(9). In context, this 
language requires that creditors be considered independently. 
Hence, a creditor who has received the benefit of a prepetition 
transfer less than that threshold may invoke the defense 
regardless of what other creditors have received. This 
comports with section 547’s text, which speaks to transfers 
“to or for the benefit of a creditor.” 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(1). It 
also accords with the interpretation reached by a number of 
bankruptcy courts. See, e.g., In re Pickens, 2007 WL 
1650140, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa June 4, 2007) (“Trustee 
cannot aggregate the total transfers of both [creditors] in this 
action to reach the $5,000 limit. Since the parties agree that 
[one creditor] received more than $5,000 in payments during 
the preference period, she is barred from asserting § 547(c)(9) 
as an affirmative defense as to those payments.”); In re 
Nelson, 419 B.R. 338, 341 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2009) 
                                                                                                     
but it has no basis in the text of the statute, which speaks in 
terms of debtors and creditors, not of transferees. Net Pay 
conceded as much. See Net Pay Reply Br. 4 (“The statute 
does not focus on the identity of the recipient of the 
transfer.”). 
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(“[Creditors] are to be considered individually when applying 
§ 547(c)(8).”). 
 The text and context of § 547(c)(9) also demonstrate 
that the minimum threshold contemplates a transfer-by-
transfer analysis. In this respect, the Trustee is wrong to 
describe the threshold as internally inconsistent. See Net Pay 
Br. 15 (“The language of [§ 547(c)(9)] is internally 
contradictory or at best ambiguous because the term 
‘aggregate’ implies a summation of various transfers, while 
the language ‘such transfer’ implies the defense should be 
applied on a payment by payment basis.”) (quoting In re 
Carter, 506 B.R. 83, 87 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2014)). In fact, the 
provision anticipates that a single transfer might be composed 
of more than one type of property and instructs that “all 
property that constitutes or is affected by” that transfer should 
be aggregated for purposes of determining whether the 
threshold is met. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(9) (emphases added).8  
 This does not mean, of course, that courts must apply 
the minimum threshold in a mindless way that would permit 
wily debtors to thwart the law by structuring multiple 
transfers in amounts less than the threshold. Although 
§ 547(c)(9) envisions creditor-by-creditor and transfer-by-
transfer analyses, both the statutory scheme and the rule that 
the singular includes the plural require that ostensibly distinct 
transfers may nevertheless be aggregated if they are, in effect, 
a single transfer on account of the same debt. See 4 Norton 
Bankr. L. & Prac. 3d § 66:33 (“Courts look behind the form 
of multiple transfers to avoid [strategic separation of transfers 
on the same underlying obligation]. When a number of less 
                                              
 8 One bankruptcy court reached this conclusion in a 
preference action against a debtor’s prepetition transfer of 
both cash and a security interest in property to each of two 
different creditors, wherein the cash and security interest 
independently fell below the minimum threshold but 
collectively exceeded it. See Pickens, 2007 WL 1650140, at 
*3–4. There, the court held that the trustee could not 
“aggregate the total transfers of both [creditors]” and that the 
property transferred to each creditor—cash and the security 
interest—could only be aggregated with respect to each 
creditor if they were “transactionally related.” Id. at *5.  
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than [$5,850] transfers occur between two parties, it is 
appropriate to treat the transfers as one transaction if they are, 
in fact, conducted pursuant to a single, common plan.”); 
Commercial Bankruptcy Litigation § 11:20 n.3 (“Multiple 
transfers to a single creditor may be aggregated where the 
underlying facts and circumstances indicate the transfers were 
part of a common plan.”) (emphasis added); Andrea Coles-
Bjerre, Bankruptcy Theory and the Acceptance of Ambiguity, 
80 Am. Bankr. L.J. 327, 354 n.85 (2006) (recognizing that 
“aggregation within a transfer—whatever those bounds may 
be—is different from aggregation across transfers”).  
 In sum, the Trustee’s reliance on § 102(7) (“the 
singular includes the plural”) cannot bear the weight he has 
placed upon it. As the District Court observed, if that 
provision had the effect of allowing the debtor to aggregate 
any and all transfers, “inclusion of the word ‘aggregate’ in the 
provision would be entirely superfluous.” Slobodian, 533 
B.R. at 133; see also Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 173 
(1997) (“It is the cardinal principle of statutory construction 
. . . to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a 
statute.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Corley v. United 
States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (explaining that “one of the 
most basic interpretive canons” is that “[a] statute should be 
construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that 
no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or 
insignificant”) (internal quotation marks omitted). As the 
foregoing explanation demonstrates, the fact that the singular 
includes the plural simply means that (1) a creditor may 
invoke the defense for multiple, independently qualifying 
transfers (i.e., it’s not a “one-and-done” defense) and (2) a 
party may defeat the defense where the challenged transfers 
are strategically divided yet transactionally related.9 
                                              
 9 The authorities relied on by the Trustee are consistent 
with this approach. Although each decision invokes § 102(7) 
in allowing aggregation of multiple preferences, the critical 
distinction is that the challenged payments in each case were 
made for the benefit of a single creditor on account of a single 
debt. See In re Hailes, 77 F.3d 873, 874–75 (5th Cir. 1996) 
(several transfers to a single creditor on account of a single 
judgment debt); In re Carter, 506 B.R. at 85–86 (multiple 
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* * * 
 In light of our interpretation of § 547(c)(9), we hold 
that Net Pay’s four small-value transfers may not be 
aggregated to exceed the minimum threshold for avoidable 
preferences. Each payment involved a different creditor (i.e., 
a different Net Pay client), unrelated antecedent debts, and 
distinct tax liabilities. Accordingly, the District Court did not 
err when it held that the payments of $5,338, $1,143, $353, 
and $281 to the IRS are not avoidable preferences. 
III 
 We now consider Net Pay’s $32,297 payment to the 
IRS on behalf of Altus, which obviously is not subject to the 
minimum threshold defense of § 547(c)(9). The question 
presented with respect to this payment is whether it was “an 
interest of the debtor in property.” 11 U.S.C. § 547(b). The 
District Court held that because Altus’s funds were held by 
Net Pay in a special statutory trust pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 
§ 7501(a), Net Pay had no interest in them. We agree. 
A 
 The Internal Revenue Code provides that “[w]henever 
any person is required to collect or withhold any internal 
revenue tax from any other person and to pay over such tax to 
the United States, the amount of tax so collected or withheld 
shall be held to be a special fund in trust for the United 
States.” 26 U.S.C. § 7501(a). This “any person”/“any other 
person” language is a vague way of saying that the provision 
                                                                                                     
payments but just one creditor and one debt); In re Transcon. 
Refrigerated Lines, Inc., 438 B.R. 520, 521 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 
2010) (permitting aggregation of three separate transfers to a 
single creditor in satisfaction of a single debt); In re Bunner, 
145 B.R. 266, 267 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1992) (same, with respect 
to separate garnishment payments); In re Alarcon, 186 B.R. 
135, 137 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1995) (same); see also Pickens, 
2007 WL 1650140, at *4 (“Cases arising under the consumer 
small preference exception are not helpful as they, almost 
without exception, consider multiple small payments to a 
single creditor on a single debt, with the majority of the cases 
considering wage garnishment.”) (emphases added). 
 13 
applies to federal taxes that Congress requires employers to 
withhold from their employees’ paychecks, otherwise known 
as “trust fund taxes.” Begier, 496 U.S. at 54; In re Calabrese, 
689 F.3d 312, 316 (3d Cir. 2012).  
 The Supreme Court interpreted § 7501(a) in Begier, 
which involved an airline that declared bankruptcy after 
paying certain withholding taxes to the IRS. 496 U.S. at 55–
56. The airline had commingled some of the trust fund taxes 
that it withheld from its employees with money in its general 
operating account, and then transferred funds to the IRS in 
satisfaction of its trust fund tax obligations from both the 
commingled general account and a segregated tax-fund-only 
account. Id. When the airline tried to avoid all these payments 
as preferential transfers, the IRS countered that the airline 
never had an interest in the funds because of § 7501(a).  Id. at 
56–57. 
 The Court began its analysis by defining “interest of 
the debtor in property.” Noting that “the purpose of the 
avoidance provision is to preserve the property includable 
within the bankruptcy estate,” the Court reasoned that 
“‘property of the debtor’ subject to the preferential transfer 
provision is best understood as that property that would have 
been part of the estate had it not been transferred before the 
commencement of bankruptcy proceedings.” Id. at 58. The 
Court then turned to the Code’s definition of “property of the 
estate,” which includes “all legal or equitable interests of the 
debtor in property as of the commencement of the case” but 
excludes property in which the debtor holds “only legal title 
and not an equitable interest.” Id. at 59 (quoting 11 U.S.C. 
§ 541(a), (d)). Because a debtor “does not own an equitable 
interest in property he holds in trust for another,” the Court 
concluded that such property is not subject to § 547(b). Id.  
 Having established the legal framework, the Court 
articulated a two-pronged inquiry for deciding whether a 
prepetition transfer from a debtor to the IRS is unavoidable 
under § 7501(a): (1) whether a special statutory trust was 
created with respect to a certain dollar amount in the first 
place; and (2) if so, whether the assets used to pay the IRS 
were assets belonging to that trust. Id. at 57–67. On the first 
question, the airline argued that even though § 7501(a) 
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creates a statutory trust extending to “the amount of tax . 
. . collected or withheld,” a trust fund tax is not “collected or 
withheld” until specific funds are either sent to the IRS with 
the relevant return or placed in a segregated fund. Id. at 60. 
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the trust was 
created at the moment the relevant taxes were withheld, and 
that “[w]ithholding . . . occurs at the time of payment to the 
employee of his net wages.” Id. at 60–61. It followed that the 
airline created a special trust for the benefit of the United 
States once it withheld the funds from its employees’ 
paychecks. Id. at 60–62. 
 The Court then considered the second prong of the 
trust inquiry: whether the assets the airline used to pay the 
IRS belonged to that trust. Id at 57–67. Absent statutory 
guidance on this tracing question, the Court first considered 
the common law. Id. at 62. But the Court found that unhelpful 
because, “[u]nder common law principles, a trust is created in 
property; a trust therefore does not come into existence until 
the settler identifies an ascertainable interest in property to be 
the trust res.” Id. (emphasis added). The statute’s approach is 
“radically different.” Id. It provides that “the amount of [trust-
fund] tax . . . collected or withheld shall be held to be a 
special fund in trust for the United States.” Id. (quoting 
§ 7501(a)) (alteration in original). Hence, rather than 
envisioning a particular property to be the trust res, § 7501(a) 
“creates a trust in an abstract ‘amount’—a dollar figure not 
tied to any particular assets—rather than in the actual dollars 
withheld.”10 Id. It therefore made no sense for the Court to 
apply common law tracing rules to the particular dollars 
                                              
10  Some have called into question the propriety of 
using trust law when applying § 7501(a). See In re Catholic 
Diocese of Wilmington, Inc., 432 B.R. 135, 156 (Bankr. D. 
Del. 2010) (“Not only does the ‘§ 7501 trust’ at issue in 
Begier not fit ‘the common law paradigm,’ it is not even a 
‘trust’ as that term is used under the law. You simply cannot 
have a trust without trust property. The ‘amount of tax’ is not 
property. Rather, it is the value of the property.”); Begier, 496 
U.S. at 68 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“One ‘traces’ a fund only 
after one identifies the fund in the first place. The problem 
here is not ‘following the res’ of the tax trust, but identifying 
the res to begin with.”).  
 15 
withheld and the particular dollars paid to the IRS. Id. at 62–
63. 
 Having rejected the strict tracing rule of the common 
law, the Court was faced with a dilemma. “Congress,” the 
Court surmised, “expected that the IRS would have to show 
some connection between the § 7501 trust and the assets 
sought to be applied to a debtor’s trust-fund tax obligations.” 
Id. at 65–66. The question was how much of a connection? 
Relying on legislative history as “persuasive evidence of 
Congressional intent,” 11  the Court held that courts should 
allow the IRS to apply “reasonable assumptions” to govern 
the tracing of withheld funds. Id. at 64–66 & n.5. One such 
assumption identified by the Court is “that any voluntary 
prepetition payment of trust-fund taxes out of the debtor’s 
assets is not a transfer of the debtor’s property.” Id. at 67. 
Hence, “the debtor’s act of voluntarily paying its trust-fund 
tax obligation . . . is alone sufficient to establish the required 
nexus between the ‘amount’ held in trust and the funds paid.” 
Id. at 66–67. In other words, “the bankruptcy trustee could 
not avoid any voluntary prepetition payment of trust-fund 
taxes, regardless of the source of the funds.” Id. at 66. 
Because the airline had voluntarily paid its trust fund tax 
obligation out of its assets, the Court held that the transferred 
amount had merely been held in trust by the airline and thus 
could not be avoided as a preference. Id. at 67. 
B 
 Our rather detailed exposition on Begier is necessary 
here because there is only one meaningful difference between 
that case and this appeal: here, the debtor is an intermediary 
that withheld and paid taxes on behalf of its client-employers. 
                                              
11  The Court likely would have arrived at the same 
conclusion even without its reliance on legislative history. See 
Begier, 496 U.S. at 70 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“If the Court 
had applied to the text of the statute the standard tools of legal 
reasoning, instead of scouring the legislative history for some 
scrap that is on point (and therefore ipso facto relevant, no 
matter how unlikely a source of congressional reliance or 
attention), it would have reached the same result it does 
today.”). 
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According to the Trustee, this distinction makes all the 
difference because the “obvious meaning of the statute is that 
in order for a trust to be created, a person who is required to 
collect the tax must actually withhold the tax.” Net Pay Br. 
11. Because Net Pay’s clients, not Net Pay itself, were 
required to withhold the taxes at issue, the Trustee suggests 
that those withholdings escape the statute. Id. at 11–12. We 
are not persuaded.  
 Section 7501(a) provides that “[w]henever any person 
is required to collect or withhold any internal revenue tax 
from any other person and to pay over such tax to the United 
States, the amount of tax so collected or withheld shall be 
held to be a special fund in trust for the United States.” 26 
U.S.C. § 7501(a). Net Pay’s clients indisputably were persons 
“required to collect or withhold any internal revenue tax from 
[their employees] and to pay over such tax to the United 
States.” 26 U.S.C. § 7501(a). And the provision does not say 
that clients themselves must be the only ones involved in the 
withholding process in order for trust principles to be 
implicated. It simply says that whenever an employer is 
required to withhold employee taxes, the “amount of tax” that 
is “so collected or withheld shall be held to be a special fund 
in trust for the United States.” 26 U.S.C. § 7501(a). Nothing 
there suggests that an employer may avoid the fact that an 
amount required by law is being held in trust for the United 
States merely by outsourcing payroll processing to a third 
party. In fact, reading the statute that way would contravene 
Begier, which instructs that “[n]othing in § 7501 indicates . . . 
that Congress wanted the IRS to be protected only insofar as 
dictated by the debtor’s whim.” 496 U.S. at 61. In effect, Net 
Pay’s construction amends the statute to read: Whenever any 
person is required to collect or withhold any internal revenue 
tax from any other person and to pay over such tax to the 
United States, the amount of tax so collected or withheld by 
the person so required, and only if by that person alone, shall 
be held to be a special fund in trust for the United States. 
Such a limit is present neither in the statute’s text nor in the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Begier. 
 The Trustee cites various cases in support of its 
interpretation, but none carry the day. He quotes seemingly 
helpful language from In re Warnaco Group, Inc., but omits 
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crucial details. Warnaco involved a staffing company (Pro 
Staff) that provided the debtor with employees in exchange 
for fees and reimbursements. 2006 WL 278152, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2006). Rejecting Pro Staff’s argument that 
certain payments from the debtor to Pro Staff represented 
employees’ withheld taxes and were not avoidable, the 
District Court distinguished Begier because “[i]n that case, 
the employer, and no one else, withheld taxes.” Id. at 5. 
Although this snippet appears to support the Trustee’s 
argument that third-party involvement vitiates trust status, the 
real reason the situation was distinguishable from Begier was 
that the transfers the debtor sought to avoid were not 
payments of withholding taxes, but rather, reimbursements to 
Pro Staff “for monies already paid by Pro Staff to employees 
for salaries, taxing authorities and insurance premiums.” Id. at 
5 (emphasis added). As the court explained, “none of the 
amount paid to Pro Staff was specifically and directly 
reserved for withholding taxes. Rather, Pro Staff could do 
with that money as it saw fit.” Id. Thus, the arrangement in 
Warnaco differed markedly from the one at issue in this case, 
where the amount paid to the IRS was reserved by the 
employer (Altus) for withholding taxes. 
 The bankruptcy court’s decision in In re U.S. Wireless 
Corp. is similarly inapposite. Net Pay cites that case for the 
proposition that trust status is dependent upon the identity of 
the person who does the withholding. But U.S. Wireless says 
no such thing. Rather, it merely held that no statutory trust 
was created when the debtor-company forgot to withhold 
taxes from an employee’s paycheck and then simply paid the 
taxes itself. 333 B.R. 688, 695 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005). 
Because “the statute’s own terms limit the trust to the amount 
so ‘collected or withheld,’” the bankruptcy court reasoned, 
the fact that the debtor “never collected or withheld any 
money from [the employee]” meant that “no trust could have 
been created” and that “[t]he property belonged to the 
[debtor] and is, therefore, potentially recoverable.” Id. Here, 
by contrast, we are dealing with amounts that were properly 
withheld and paid over to the IRS.12 
                                              
12  One bankruptcy court decision does support Net 
Pay’s interpretation. See In re FirstPay, Inc., 2012 WL 
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* * * 
 Section 7501(a)’s language is broad enough to cover 
the facts of this case. It makes no difference that Net Pay’s 
customers used the company as an intermediary to withhold 
and pay its employees’ taxes. The Altus payment represented 
an amount it was “required to . . . withhold,” 26 U.S.C. 
§ 7501(a), and that was so withheld pursuant to the contract 
between Altus and Net Pay. The Tax Code thus deems the 
amount to have been “held to be a special fund in trust for the 
United States.” 26 U.S.C. § 7501(a). And because the amount 
was paid out of Altus’s assets, the traceability nexus is met. 
See Begier, 496 U.S. at 66–67. Accordingly, the District 
Court did not err when it held that Net Pay lacked any interest 
in the property and may not avoid the transfer. 
C 
 The Trustee argues that even if the statutory trust 
provision applies, $6,527.90 of the Altus payment may be 
avoided as a preference because it was marked for employer, 
non-trust-fund tax obligations. An internal payroll summary 
indicates that Altus had generated $25,769.90 in trust fund 
taxes and $6,527.90 in non-trust-fund taxes during the period 
covered by the summary: April 1–May 31, 2011. 
Accordingly, the Trustee argues that it’s unclear that the 
entire $32,297 sum was applied to Altus’s trust fund tax 
obligations.  
                                                                                                     
3778952 (Bankr. D. Md. Aug. 30, 2012). But that decision—
which also involved a payroll-company debtor—is virtually 
devoid of analysis. See id. at *5 (“In the present case, in 
contrast to Begier, FirstPay was not holding the subject funds 
in a statutory trust for the IRS pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7501, 
as the funds were not collected or withheld by FirstPay to 
meet its own trust-fund tax obligations.”) (emphasis added). 
Rather than correcting this faulty and conclusory reasoning, 
the Fourth Circuit simply held that the relevant funds were 
held in a state-law trust and did not consider whether the 
federal statutory trust provision applied. See In re FirstPay, 
Inc., 773 F.3d 583, 592–94 (4th Cir. 2014). 
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 The District Court did not err in holding that there is 
no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the entire 
Altus payment was applied to Altus’s trust fund obligations. 
The record shows that on April 28, 2011, Net Pay withdrew 
$114,335 from Altus’s bank account, of which $32,297 was 
designated for payment to the IRS on or before May 6, 2011. 
Both trust-fund and non-trust-fund portions of federal 
employment taxes were generated throughout the quarter as 
Altus’s employees earned wages. See Donelan Phelps & Co. 
v. United States, 876 F.2d 1373, 1374–75 (8th Cir. 1989); 
Calabrese, 689 F.3d at 316. Critically, the moment when 
taxes accrue is irrelevant to which portion of the tax liability 
is actually paid. Consistent with standard IRS practice, non-
trust-fund taxes are deemed to be paid first, even though they 
may accrue later in that quarter. In re Ribs-R-Us, Inc., 828 
F.2d 199, 201 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Westerman v. United 
States, 718 F.3d 743, 749 (8th Cir. 2013). There was 
unrebutted testimony on the record to this effect. And while 
the document upon which the Trustee relies does not identify 
what portion of Altus’s non-trust-fund and trust fund tax 
obligations were outstanding at the time, the record does. In 
the relevant period, Altus owed $164,504 in employment 
taxes. Of that amount, $137,521 consisted of trust fund taxes, 
and $26,983 consisted of non-trust-fund taxes. By the time 
the IRS received the $32,297 transfer from Net Pay, Altus 
had made deposits exceeding its $26,983 non-trust-fund 
liability for the second quarter of 2011. Consequently, the 
$32,297 payment was applied to Altus’s trust fund tax 
liability.  
 Stated differently, Altus was required to withhold 
$137,521 from its employees’ wages during the relevant 
period, and that “amount of tax so collected or withheld [was] 
held to be a special fund in trust for the United States.” 26 
U.S.C. § 7501(a). This is further demonstrated by the 
consequence of Net Pay’s logic: were some portion of that 
amount to revert to Net Pay’s estate, Altus would be on the 
hook for that exact amount in unpaid trust fund taxes. 
Because what matters for purposes of the statutory trust is the 
overall “amount” withheld, and because there is unrebutted 
evidence that the full $32,297 was withheld by Altus and paid 
over to the IRS, the District Court correctly held that there is 
no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the entire 
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Altus payment was applied to Altus’s trust fund obligations 
and was held in trust by Net Pay for the United States.13  
                                              
 13 Although the foregoing resolves this appeal on the 
same grounds as the District Court, we note that, under 
Pennsylvania state law, Net Pay would not be entitled to the 
money at issue even if its interpretation of the minimum 
threshold and the federal trust provision were correct. Absent 
federal preemption, we look to state law to determine the 
nature of a debtor’s interest in property. Butner v. United 
States, 440 U.S. 48, 54–55 (1979) (“Property interests are 
created and defined by state law. . . . [u]nless some federal 
interest requires a different result.”). Net Pay’s agreements 
with its customers designate Pennsylvania law as the 
governing law. Assuming arguendo that federal law is silent 
and that Pennsylvania law does not conflict with federal 
interests, we would conclude that the funds were held in a 
resulting trust (i.e., one implied by the circumstances) under 
Pennsylvania law. The Government has produced more than 
sufficient evidence “showing circumstances which raise an 
inference that in making the conveyance to [Net Pay], there 
was no intention [by Net Pay’s customers] to give [Net Pay] 
the beneficial interest in the property.” Mooney v. Greater 
New Castle Dev. Corp., 510 A.2d 344, 346 (Pa. 1986). See 
also In re Vosburgh’s Estate, 123 A. 813, 815 (Pa. 1924) 
(“[E]very person who receives money to be paid to another or 
to be applied to a particular purpose is a trustee, if so applied, 
as well as when not so applied.”). Were it otherwise, Net Pay 
would not have bothered to contract for a set-off right and 
security interest to secure payment of service fees since, as it 
claims, all the money it received from its customers would 
have been its property anyway. And without an equitable 
interest in the money withdrawn from each client’s account, 
§ 547(b) does not apply. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (requiring 
the debtor to have an interest in the property in order to avoid 
a transfer); Begier, 496 U.S. at 59 (observing that “[b]ecause 
the debtor does not own an equitable interest in property he 
holds in trust for another, that interest is not ‘property of the 
estate’”). 
 Moreover, even if we were to determine that 
Pennsylvania law conflicts with an important federal interest 
such that federal law governs the “interest of the debtor in 
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IV 
 Our legal analysis is supported by common sense. It is 
hard to fathom that Net Pay’s clients intended anything other 
than to “transfer only bare legal title” to Net Pay with respect 
to the funds meant for payment to the IRS. Galford v. 
Burkhouse, 478 A.2d 1328, 1334 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984). Of 
course, “[w]hether the money is held in trust must be 
determined . . . not merely by reliance on common sense, but 
also by application of traditional legal doctrines.” In re Penn 
Cent. Transp. Co., 486 F.2d 519, 524 (3d Cir. 1973). Here, as 
we have explained, those legal doctrines cohere with common 
sense. 
 Net Pay is not entitled to recoup the money it 
transferred to the IRS on behalf of its clients. Four of its 
transfers may not be challenged as preferences because they 
did not meet the statutory threshold of 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(9), 
and the Altus payment may not be avoided because Net Pay 
lacked an equitable interest in the property by operation of 26 
U.S.C. § 7501(a). For these reasons, we will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court. 
                                                                                                     
property” inquiry, we would conclude that Net Pay held the 
funds in trust pursuant to federal common law. In re 
Columbia Gas Sys. Inc., 997 F.2d 1039, 1056 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(“Federal common law imposes a trust when an entity acts as 
a conduit, collecting money from one source and forwarding 
it to its intended recipient.”); see also In re Penn Central 
Transp. Co., 486 F.2d 519, 523–27 (3d Cir. 1973) (en banc).  
 As for the tracing requirement—which in either case 
calls for application of federal rather than state tracing rules, 
see City of Farrell v. Sharon Steel Corp., 41 F.3d 92, 95–96 
(3d Cir. 1994)—we agree with the Fourth Circuit that “the 
law will presume that any funds received, held, and ultimately 
transferred by a trustee in accordance with the trust purpose 
are indeed trust funds.” FirstPay, 773 F.3d at 595. As stated, 
the Trustee has not rebutted this presumption; the funds paid 
to the IRS are clearly traceable to the funds deposited into Net 
Pay’s account just days before the transfers at issue. 
